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THE VALUE OF INCUMBENCY: A LAW AND ECONOMICS
INTERPRETATION OF PRIMARY CHALLENGES
Robert Steinbuch*
The wealth of commentary asserting the ignorance of the electorate is
almost staggering.' Consistent with this pervasive criticism, it is all but in-
evitable that during an election cycle, self-designated political experts revive
their laments over the historically high reelection rate of incumbents.2 They
go on to cherry-pick for emphasis controversial votes of incumbents that
inflame voters.3 These pundits like challenges; it gives them fodder for their
blather that the electorate's exercise of its democratic rights is lost on the
uninformed. Unfortunately, these claims not only serve to falsely delegitim-
ize our representative democracy, but they also demonstrate a fundamental
failure to understand the rational decision-making process that both produc-
es incumbency and allows our elected officials to make difficult choices.
Incumbents are repeatedly reelected, even after having made controversial
votes, not because the electorate does not have a choice but, rather, because
voters rationally understand the ramifications of their actions quite well.4
While pundits and others outside our political system often accuse American
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bo-
wen School of Law. Professor Steinbuch is a former Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, Antitrust Subcommittee, and he teaches Law and Economics. His academic interests
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1. See, e.g., Christopher Shea, Is Voter Ignorance Killing Democracy, Salon.com, Nov.
22, 1999, available at http://www.salon.com/books/it/1999/11/22/voter/ (last visited Feb. 12,
2007) ("Clearly, voter ignorance poses problems for democratic theory: Politicians, the repre-
sentatives of the people, are being elected by people who do not know their names or their
platforms. Elites are committing the nation to major treaties and sweeping policies that most
voters do not even know exist.").
2. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Restoring Faith in Government: Equal Protection
and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 273, 292 (1993) (stating that "nearly nine
out of ten incumbents seeking reelection win their races").
3. See Joel M. Gora, Buckley v. Valeo: A Landmark of Political Freedom, 33 AKRON
L. REv. 7, 29, 33 (1999) ("It may be inconvenient for incumbent politicians when groups of
citizens spend money to inform the voters about a politician's public stands on controversial
issues like term limits[,] . . . [and] [i]t may be inconvenient and annoying for incumbent
politicians when groups of citizens spend money to inform the voters about a politician's
public stands on controversial issues, like abortion.").
4. But see George Steven Swan, Robert Nozick & John F. Kennedy, The Political
Economy of Congressional Term Limits: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 47 ALA. L. REV.
775, 823 (1996) ("Economic principles ordain that a legislature (Congress) will aggrandize
itself despite the popular will, at least when it is costly to displace incumbents.").
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voters of being ignorant, the electorate's behavior typically belies such a
claim.
For long-term incumbents seeking reelection, the electorate's choice is
between someone with critical control within the institution versus someone
who will hold, by definition, the most junior-and, therefore, the weakest-
position within that body. Thus, the ultimate decision for the voters is
whether they want to reelect an incumbent who can achieve much of what
she seeks to accomplish, or a relative novice who, for some time, will rarely
be able to direct outcomes.6 Even if the incumbent can achieve, say, eighty
percent of what her voters want, the electorate is better off securing this
eighty percent rather than electing a candidate who promises one hundred
percent of what the electorate wants but is institutionally incapable of
achieving more than twenty percent. This dichotomy is most obvious when
an intra-party insurgent challenges an incumbent in a primary because the
policy differences between the candidates are almost invariably minimal-
the insurgent's predictably unremitting claims to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.
The true difficulty for an incumbent seeking reelection is that all along
the way of serving her constituency, each action will be unpopular to at least
a few individuals. The longer the incumbent serves, the larger the number of
constituents that can remember at least one vote they did not like. So, the
insurgent seeks to exploit these negative memories by adopting what has
become the standard intra-party attack formula: (1) accuse the incumbent of
being a "political insider,"7 (2) suggest that change is healthy for govern-
ment,8 and (3) employ the hackneyed "three-strikes" analogy.9 That is, the
intra-party insurgent will divide the constituency into groups and then at-
tempt to exploit each group's Achilles' heal by culling through the incum-
bent's thousands of votes to find the one or two that will anger that sub-
5. See id. at 808 ("Even the most junior incumbent will have more seniority than any
challenger on election day .... Voters can maximize their own advantage via a reelection.").
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., John Castellucci, Going One-on-One: Harwood, Bayuk Exchange Barbs,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Oct. 30, 2002, at B-01. In a race for the House Speaker position,
"[Bruce] Bayuk, who is running as an independent in [incumbent John B.] Harwood's home
district, depicted Harwood as a political insider who has misspent campaign funds, benefited
from conflicts of interest and worked behind the scenes to kill such reforms as separation-of-
powers legislation." Id.
8. See, e.g., Michelle Ku, Up to the Challenge: Newcomer Earns Kudos Guiding New-
berry to Win, LEXINGTON-HERALD LEADER (Ky.), Nov. 12, 2006, at St. & Regional News
(discussing successful challenger's campaign during the primary election, which focused on
the slogan "Folks, it's time for a change").
9. See, e.g., Dan Hoover, Bauer's Foot Puts Career on the Line, GREENVILLE NEWS
(S.C.), Apr. 2, 2006, at 13A (describing a political campaign in which a member of the same
party mentioned that the incumbent had suffered "three strikes" as a result of his lapses in
judgment and his recent traffic violations).
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group.' 0 The intra-party insurgent repeats this process for each sub-group,
using a different vote to inflame the particular voters depending on their
specific interests. In response, the incumbent is faced with the task of re-
minding the electorate of the apocryphally paraphrased Lincoln admonition
that you cannot please everyone all of the time." If this appears self-
indulgent rather than pedagogical, the intra-party insurgent will benefit.
The problem with the intra-party insurgent formula is that it is mis-
placed, if not simply wrong. First, being an insider is not, in itself, a nega-
tive. Indeed, given our political system, it is a positive, as it allows the
elected official to achieve more of her agenda.
Second, even if change is healthy for government, which it certainly
can be, voters face what economists call the "tragedy of the commons."12
That is, if change is optimal and universal, all are better off. However, if
only one or a few electoral seats opt for change, while the rest do not, then
those few innovating districts will be worse off due to the disparate diminu-
tion in power. And, since the voters in one district cannot control what other
districts do, the rational decision is to vote for incumbents over similarly
philosophized primary challengers.
Third, the baseball analogy is intentionally misapplied. In baseball,
when a batter strikes out, he is not kicked off the team; he goes back to the
dugout to wait for his next at-bat. Indeed, the greatest all-stars have a thirty
percent batting average. 3 Insurgents suggest that incumbents should have a
ninety-nine percent batting average and, if they do not, that they should be
summarily kicked out of office. This is hardly reasonable in politics, and it
is certainly not done in baseball. Of course, the intra-party insurgent sug-
gests this approach merely because he recognizes that the application of the
strike-out scheme is really just a method to eviscerate long-term political
continuity. And, what an insurgent wants more than anything is to ensure
10. See Gora, supra note 3, at 29, 33 (indicating that challengers will pick out the in-
cumbents' votes on controversial issues such as abortion and term limits).
11. The quotation actually attributed to Abraham Lincoln is "You can fool some of the
people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the
people all of the time." See, e.g., JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF
PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN
LITERATURE (Nathan Haskell Dole rev., 10th ed., Bartleby.com 2000) (Little, Brown & Co.
1919), available at http://www.bartleby.com/100/448.16.html.
12. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 471, 485 (2003) ("The 'tragedy of the commons' is that failure to recognize
perpetual and transferable property rights in tangible property leads inevitably to 'overgraz-
ing,' as soon as an item of property enters the public domain from which everyone may draw
freely. Recognition of perpetual property rights leads to economic efficiency, because a ra-
tional owner will optimize the balance between present and future consumption.").
13. See generally National Baseball Hall of Fame, http://www.baseballhallof
fame.org/hofers and honorees/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007) (providing batting
averages for all Hall of Fame members).
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that his opponent does not continue in office--conveniently opening the seat
for the insurgent.
The pundits can bemoan the incumbency reelection rate, and intra-
party insurgents can attempt to exploit constituents' specific negative mem-
ories. But, voters have historically outsmarted both and done what is in their
best interest. Consciously or unconsciously, voters have applied an econom-
ic analysis to determine the value of incumbency, and consequently, they
have been unswayed by challengers' and "pundits"' arguments attempting to
oust the incumbents. 4
14. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 24 (2003) (discussing the
implicit economic logic of legal doctrine).
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